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1 – Introduction 
Medicine is said to be moving further and further down the 
road towards personalization, but it is not entirely clear how 
we are to understand this term, or how it should be regarded 
from a bioethical point of view. In understanding the concept 
of personalized medicine there are multiple possible interpre-
tations of ‘personalization’ at stake. This is important because 
the terms used to describe the type of medical interventions 
on offer may seem to promise much, and they have conse-
quences for the expectations of patients, clients and society 
(see, e.g., Hedgecoe 2004; Tutton 2014; Wöhlke et al. 2015). 
It should of course be noted that while there have been and 
continue to be attempts to provide definitions of personal-
ized medicine, there have also been moves to go beyond the 
term ‘personalized’ to use others such as ‘precision’ medicine. 
‘Stratification’ is also a term that is frequently used with, at 
first sight, very different implications both for user perspec-
tives and for ethics. This paper aims first to explain why the 
choice of term is itself an ethical issue, and then to provide a 
typology of senses currently in use and their bioethical impli-
cations. In doing this I aim to distinguish and explore ten dif-
ferent possibilities for understanding the term ‘personalized 
medicine’. I do not claim that this is an exhaustive account: 
there may be others. The investigation of different senses will 
inevitably also uncover presuppositions about how ‘persons’ 
are being conceptualized in the health care context, and these 
presuppositions influence how health care encounters are 
framed from an ethical point of view (Prainsack 2014). 
2 – Why is it important to elu-
cidate different meanings of 
‘personalized’? 
There are at least three reasons why investigation of the term 
‘personalized’ is important. These include: the generation of 
expectations; implications for professional ethics; and impli-
cations for public health, including responsibility for health.
2.1 Expectations
The first reason, already alluded to above, concerns the ex-
pectations of patients, clients and society in the event of a 
new model of medicine being promised or forthcoming (Tut-
ton 2014). It is true that, under a system that did not label it-
self as personalized, patients may well, even so, have expect-
ed that their doctor and other health professionals would act 
in the best interests of them as individual patients, whether 
their actual experience proved in fact to be good or bad. What 
must have been a familiar experience for many patients, how-
ever, and perhaps still is, was to be advised by a doctor to try a 
certain prescribed regime, and if it did not work, to return in 
two or three weeks to try something else – the ‘trial and error’ 
approach to medicine.
What were not highly publicized, until relatively recently, 
were the reasons for and drawbacks of this trial and error ap-
proach. While it was known that any given treatment would 
only work on a proportion of patients, and in fact could be 
positively harmful to some, there was no advantage in broad-
casting widely the statistics of drug-induced mortality and 
morbidity. This is not to suggest that patients were not made 
aware of possible side effects, but the overall success rates of 
this model of medicine were not widely publicly discussed, 
although issues surrounding specific therapeutic agents (e.g. 
thalidomide) may have been. But when pharmacogenetics 
became a realistic option, there were indeed good reasons to 
publicise these statistics, in order to garner support for the 
use of genetically informed prescribing as a new way of offer-
ing medical treatment. It takes time, however, for these argu-
ments to become widely recognised and accepted.
So what effect does it have on expectations to describe the 
new era of medicine as ‘personalized’? There is some em-
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pirical evidence to suggest that the term ‘personalized’ still 
suggests to patients that their interests are somehow being 
taken care of in a ‘personal’ way (see, e.g., Heusser 2015) –
this may be because they think they are being treated with 
the respect due to an autonomous person’s wishes, or be-
cause they believe themselves to be treated as more than ‘just 
another case’. Peter Heusser tackles the issue of the differing 
understandings of patients and clinicians in arguing for the 
integration of ‘personalized’ and ‘person-centred’ medicine 
(Heusser 2015), the latter corresponding to a sense of per-
sonalization discussed below.
2.2 Professional ethics
The second reason for examining the concept of ‘personali-
zation’ in detail is that different conceptions have different 
ethical implications, not only for professionals and clients 
but for the relationship between the two, e.g., in the counsel-
ling encounter, and for data handlers and controllers. There 
are questions about the extent to which traditional ethical 
precepts can continue to apply in the context of personali-
zation – for example, the ethos of non-directiveness in coun-
selling. The very depiction of the counselling relationship in 
terms of who has what expertise, may need rethinking. The 
traditional picture of a counsellor being an expert in genetic 
risk information which has to be imparted to a client – who 
may themselves have expertise of a different kind (relating 
for example to detailed family history knowledge, experience 
of their condition, and values) – may not stand up in the face 
of a deluge of data emerging in the genomic or post-genomic 
era. The mass of data in this new context may require a dif-
ferent kind of specialism in the interpretation of data, with 
associated shifts in the locus of expertise. 
2.3 Public health and responsibility for health
The third reason for examining the meaning of personaliza-
tion relates to the implications for public health planning, re-
source allocation in health care, and individual responsibility 
for health. Some interpretations of personalization appear to 
place more responsibility on the shoulders of the individu-
al, at a time when there are already moves in different con-
texts to encourage or ‘nudge’ individuals to take measures to 
reduce alcohol, take more exercise, eat healthily, and so on. 
(Sunstein and Thaler 2008).
In sum, then, it is important to investigate different concep-
tions of personalization because they will inevitably have 
practical consequences for professionals, patients and cli-
ents, and the relationship between the two. There will also 
be implications for public health planning and resources, 
in light of opportunity costs of pursuing a certain model of 
health delivery. Michael Snyder has suggested that personal-
ized medicine might not reduce health care spending overall, 
although this may depend on the context in question (Snyder 
2016). With these points in mind I shall now proceed to the 
examination of different possible interpretations. 
3 – Senses of personalization 
3.1 Personalization = individualisation
First, to personalize medicine might be equivalent to treating 
the patient as an individual: the application of medical judg-
ment to the individual case, n=1. It might be objected that 
medicine has always been personalized in this sense; it is just 
that new tools have become and continue to become availa-
ble. That being the case, it seems that this sense can scarcely 
denote something new in the modern era. Nevertheless, it 
might be thought that the application of professional judg-
ment to the individual case could in principle be embracing 
of individual diversity. This depends, however, on the way the 
‘individual case’ is conceptualized – whether, for example, it 
is conceived as a set of symptoms or as something richer.
The idea of the clinical trial involving N-of-1, however, which 
has been suggested as a consequence of individual variability, 
and which is also related to this sense of personalization, ar-
guably does represent a significant shift in so far as it refers to 
a reconfiguration of the historic practice of conducting clini-
cal trials (Schork 2015).
3.2 Personalization as person-centredness
The second sense in which medicine might be said to be per-
sonalized is in being ‘person-centred’ (Heusser 2015). To 
personalize medicine in this sense could be understood as 
respecting the patient as a person with their own ideals and 
goals. This sense presupposes that the patient, in the central 
case, is an autonomous adult with capacity to make decisions 
about their treatment: underlying this is the concept of a 
person as the subject of a life. (There are of course special 
issues concerning those with diminished or still developing 
capacity for autonomy). While this remains important, it is 
not the sense of personalization which is primarily common-
ly at stake in contemporary discussions of personalization in 
relation to emerging technologies, despite arguments for in-
tegration of different senses, a point to which we shall return.
3.3 Personalization as holism
It is important to note that the second sense of personali-
zation above may or may not be combined with a holistic 
approach: the view that the patient should be regarded as a 
whole person. This may mean no more than that the individ-
ual should not just be identified with a set of symptoms, such 
as a broken leg or a case of tuberculosis. There is a perfectly 
ordinary way of speaking in which to personalize medicine 
can be understood in that way and it is possible that this may 
be envisaged by patients, their relatives and others on hear-
ing the term ‘personalized medicine’.
While the relationship between holism and person-centred-
ness is not clear, it is possible to practice ‘person-centred’ 
medicine, embracing the principle of respect for persons, 
while still viewing the ‘case’ in relation to one disease rather 
than in a holistic way. On the other hand, it might be argued 
that holism requires a broader concept of the person than the 
‘subject of a life’ – for example, looking at the individual in 
context, in relation to others, rather than as an isolated in-
dividual.
Once again, however, this is hardly a new debate, so holism 
cannot be the, or a, sense that describes a developing and 
transformative model of medicine.
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3.4 Personalization as enabling personal health 
self-monitoring
One development that is new and developing is the use of 
wearable technology to allow people to monitor their own 
health conditions. Devices such as Fitbits and the Apple 
watch are increasing in number and growing in sophistica-
tion in terms of the range of bodily functions they can moni-
tor.  Why might this be interpreted as the ‘personalization’ of 
medicine? Personalization in this sense is associated with an 
increase in personal responsibility for health, in some ways 
enabling the person to be more in control, not only in mon-
itoring their own health status but also in taking steps (per-
haps literally) to improve matters. In this category person-
alization is concerned not only with ameliorative medicine 
(although it may be used for existing patients) but also with 
prevention. We are going beyond the patient as person here 
to include the worried well (or not so worried), in the class of 
persons potentially affected by this development.
In addition to the ethical implications of increased respon-
sibility for health and possible associated anxiety or even 
health narcissism, there are personal security issues associ-
ated with wearable technologies. The very fact of the use of 
these devices to collect data, without full awareness of those 
who use them, raises issues of personal privacy and securi-
ty. Employees may be encouraged to wear these devices in 
exchange for health insurance benefits, or to monitor their 
activity for the benefit of employers (Rutkin 2014).
The concept of the person at stake here has to be one that 
is compatible with the idea of taking responsibility for one’s 
own health, which implies autonomous decision making, but 
could co-exist with greater or lesser degrees of individualism. 
Barbara Prainsack has drawn attention to the need to beware 
of assumptions about individual decision-making inherent in 
contemporary western thinking and has pointed towards the 
possibility of a more relational, solidaristic approach (Prain-
sack 2014). In a communitarian context, it may be important 
to take responsibility for one’s own health to avoid being a 
burden on the group. Indeed, the effect on others through 
passive smoking has formed a major part of the arguments 
that individuals should not smoke in shared environments.
3.5 Personalization as genetically informed 
prescribing
Turning from these debates it is fair to say, however, that 
contemporary discussion about personalized medicine began 
with a surge in interest in pharmacogenetics, especially fol-
lowing the completion of the Human Genome Project at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century.  Pharmacogenetics is 
not itself a new idea: it has been around at least since the 
1950s, but once again developing science and technology has 
facilitated considerable developments and moved it centre 
stage. The basic personalization idea here is that the prescrib-
ing of medicines should be in accordance with the person’s 
genetic makeup, and this can be relevant to both the choice of 
drug and the appropriate dosage (Alfirevic and Pirmohamed 
2016).
What is striking here is the use of the term ‘personalization’ 
when what is significant about the person in this context is 
identified with his or her genetic-make up rather than that 
they are autonomous individuals, or that they exist in a com-
munity in relation to others. On the contrary, what is of inter-
est is the ways in which they vary, or are unique in respect to 
their DNA; within this context, what is important about per-
sons is not what they have in common (e.g., a capacity for au-
tonomy) but the ways in which they differ.  Genetic variation, 
not phenotypic variation, counts under this interpretation as 
what is significant for the practice of personalized medicine. 
It might be argued, with good reason, that it is still a large 
step from this to saying that the ‘person’ him- or herself is 
identified with or reduced to their genetic make-up.
From an ethical point of view, it is interesting, as already not-
ed above, that the emergence of interest in pharmacogenet-
ics led to emphasis on the ways in which medicine does not 
work: the promise of the move towards pharmacogenetically 
informed prescribing is that it will facilitate a significant re-
duction in the incidence of iatrogenic morbidity and mortali-
ty (Alfirevic and Pirmohamed 2016).
On close inspection, however, pharmacogenetic information 
by itself allows only for a weak sense of personalization. A ge-
netic test may allow for a patient to be categorised as a good 
or poor responder to a particular drug, a slow or a fast me-
taboliser. This is arguably better described as patient strati-
fication, and in fact it is so called by some (Schleidgen et al. 
2015). And it might be asked what, in particular, is personal-
ized about that? To that sense of personalization I shall now 
turn. 
3.6 Personalization as stratification of the pa-
tient population
In The Ethics of Personalized Medicine: Critical Perspec-
tives (2015) Sebastien Schleidgen et al. describe the results 
of a systematic review as a result of which the definition they 
opt for is that “PM seeks to improve stratification and tim-
ing of health care by utilising biological information and bio-
markers on the level of molecular disease pathways, genetics, 
proteomics as well as metabolomics” (Schleidgen et al.  2015, 
p. 23). This is interesting in that they ultimately develop a 
definition that includes ‘stratification’ rather than ‘tailoring’, 
although they included the latter term in a preliminary defi-
nition. The authors argue that it would in fact be a mistake to 
give the impression that personalized medicine is about indi-
viduals rather than about categorising patients into groups: 
stratification is the more accurate — and, perhaps the more 
honest — term in relation to patient expectations. This is very 
important in the discussion of the ethics of personalization 
because if the term is misleading then there could be adverse 
consequences in terms of patient response.
Despite this rejection of the tailoring metaphor, it continues 
nevertheless to be very widely used, and it is to this that I 
shall now turn.
3.7 Personalization as tailoring treatment and 
advice to the person’s genome
The tailoring metaphor was used in the UK at least as early 
as 2003 in the Department of Health White Paper: Our In-
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heritance Our Future. The then Secretary of State for Health, 
John Reid, wrote in the foreword that “[A]bove all, genetics 
holds out the promise of more personalized healthcare with 
prevention and treatment tailored according to a person’s in-
dividual genetic profile” (UK Department of Health 2003, p. 
5). The importance of prevention is emphasized, suggesting 
that a patient and their GP will be “able to make more per-
sonalized decisions on lifestyle changes or drug therapy to 
reduce his likelihood of developing heart disease” (ibid. p 15).
The tailoring metaphor is at first sight attractive and a neat 
way of illustrating the point. An analogy is made here be-
tween taking the precise measurements of a person in order 
to tailor clothes to their outer physical form, and finding the 
inner genetic key to their predispositions and risk factors, so 
that not only treatment but also lifestyle advice can be ‘tai-
lored’ to their own particular genetic make-up, in all its rich 
variety. The presumption here, in order for the analogy to 
work, is that more than a single pharmacogenetic test is re-
quired – the whole genome will need to be sequenced.
As has been argued elsewhere (Chadwick 2014), however, 
the tailoring metaphor, despite its attractive accessibility, is 
deceptive. First, in tailoring itself there is a distinction be-
tween ‘made to measure’ and ‘bespoke’. “Whereas mass mar-
ket shopping makes clothes to a universal pattern, made to 
measure adapts such a pattern to the measurements of an 
individual, and ‘bespoke’ tailoring proceeds according to 
the requirements of the individual person. It might appear 
that the move from blockbuster drugs (in the ‘trial and error’ 
approach) to genomically informed prescribing mirrors the 
distinction between mass market and made to measure, but 
it is more complicated than that” (ibid., p.6).  In the word 
‘bespoke’ there is a clue to something that is very significant. 
Bespoke tailoring requires one who ‘bespeaks’, i.e., an auton-
omous consumer.  Transferring this to the medical context, 
the tailoring metaphor suggests the need for an autonomous 
patient/person to request the tests. In one possible vision of 
the future, however, individuals will be routinely sequenced 
in childhood or even at birth and their data stored through-
out life (see Capps et al. 2013).
An objection from a completely different perspective was put 
forward in a classic article by Abdallah Daar and Peter A. 
Singer: such health care is a ‘boutique’ model, suitable only 
for resource rich countries with a very individualistic culture. 
Although they are not talking about tailoring here, or indeed 
whole genome sequencing, the use of the word ‘boutique’ 
implies a contrast between ‘designer’ and ‘high street’ cloth-
ing. They argued that the potential benefits of genetically in-
formed medicine should, instead, be harnessed for deploy-
ment in resource poor environments (Daar and Singer 2005). 
There are, then, different considerations at stake here.  One is 
the presumption in the tailoring metaphor of the autonomous 
consumer: in Daar and Singer the emphasis is on the wealth 
(as in a resource-rich context) rather than the autonomy of 
the consumer. As far as the understanding of personalization 
is concerned, however, the main point is that the tailoring 
metaphor suggests a genome-wide interest in the person, 
rather than what might be a single genetic test in the context 
of pharmacogenetics. Daar and Singer’s point can in princi-
ple apply to either in so far as it is a point about resources. 
Ethical questions relating to tailoring include the implica-
tions for the health care professional-client relationship. 
The more that medicine delivers ‘precise’ results, it might 
be thought that there is less room for professional judgment 
– rather it may be envisaged that the right course of action 
would emerge from a correct reading of the data. There have 
been suggestions that what might be required is a specialist 
interpreter of data (Capps et al. 2014). Of course, it is possi-
ble to be precise and wrong: although the purpose of taking 
precise measurements is to get a perfect fit, a slight error in 
taking those precise measurements can result in an uncom-
fortably tight suit of clothes. 
The newer term ‘precision medicine’, as in the Precision 
Medicine Initiative of the United States established under 
President Obama (White House 2016), becomes relevant 
here. While the introduction of the term ‘precision medicine’ 
avoids the focus on the person and the associated implication 
that medicine has not always been personalized (see sense 1 
above) it might also be regarded as fitting very well the tai-
loring metaphor and the taking of exact measurements (see 
Juengst et al. 2016). In fact, precision medicine “is defined 
as the tailoring of clinical strategies based on genomic, ge-
netic, behavioral and environment background of individual 
patients” (Wong and Deng 2015).  
The definition of precision medicine here, however, includes 
taking into account factors over and above genetic and 
genomic information, and next in line for consideration is 
epigenetics.
3.8 Personalization as tailoring to the person’s 
genome, read in the context of the epigenome
The rapidly developing science of epigenetics and epigenom-
ics has further complicated the picture of what is envisaged in 
personalized medicine. Epigenetics is concerned with factors 
‘over and above’ the genome which affect gene expression, 
such as environmental factors, but also individual behaviour 
and lifestyle. One of the mechanisms by which this happens 
is methylation, whereby different sites on the genome come 
to have epigenetic markers attached to them, which can then, 
in turn, be transmitted to future generations (Chadwick and 
O’Connor 2013). While the fact that environment affects gene 
expression is not new, for a long time it was akin to heresy to 
suggest that epigenetic changes could be heritable, which is 
now clearly the case. There has been considerable interest in 
the ways in which behaviour during pregnancy can affect not 
only the fetus in question, but also future generations (Hes-
sler 2013). This has given rise to concerns about burdens of 
responsibility for women, but there are issues for men also. A 
study in Denmark showed differences in epigenetic markers 
between sperm samples taken from lean and obese men (Bar-
rès 2016). Further work is planned to investigate whether the 
preconception weight of fathers can affect embryos. 
The ethical implications here are considerable. First, the sci-
ence of epigenetics suggests that the concept of the person 
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has to extend beyond the genome: it has to be environmental-
ly situated. The picture of the isolated autonomous individual 
taking decisions about his or her own body is too narrow to 
cope with epigenetics, in a situation where decisions about 
one’s lifestyle and environment can affect future generations 
through the epigenetic mechanisms. These difficult questions 
about responsibility, for one’s own health and that of the next 
and future generations, involve taking into account much 
more information than previously supposed. It would be a 
mistake, however, to think that epigenetics brings to the fore 
new questions of responsibility only for individual persons. 
Toxins in the environment have epigenetic effects, so there 
are issues of responsibility, regarding public health effects, 
for institutions and corporations as well.   Epigenomics may 
in fact be empowering for individuals. Chiapperino and Tes-
ta suggest “different framings of epigenomic evidence and 
empowerment discourses… are in fact likely to have a fun-
damental bearing upon the roles and obligations of agents in 
the emerging vision of PM, including quite possibly on our 
self-understanding as citizens, patients and health-care con-
sumers” (Chiapperino and Testa 2016, p. 216).
The main point to take from this section is that a tailoring 
that looks at the genome in isolation from epigenetic data is 
going to risk missing out significant relevant factors. If pre-
cision medicine leads to potential rethinking of the profes-
sional-client relationship (Juengst et al. 2016), however, the 
need to take environmental factors into account arguably re-
quires even more thinking about the kind of expertise needed 
in order to offer accurate and helpful lifestyle and treatment 
advice.
3.9 Personalization as tailoring medicine in the 
light of multi-omic information
Beyond epigenomics, different kinds of ‘omics’ are them-
selves reproducing, however, so that we are now contemplat-
ing an era of multi-omics. The microbiome, for example, is 
increasingly of interest, as research turns to the health ef-
fects of the populations of bacteria that inhabit the human 
gut, along with a plethora of advice in health and lifestyle lit-
erature about prebiotics and probiotics.   The definition of 
personalized medicine in the EU, used by the Horizon 2020 
Advisory Group, has defined personalized medicine in the 
following way: “a medical model using characterization of 
individuals’ phenotypes and genotypes (e.g. molecular pro-
filing, medical imaging, lifestyle data) for tailoring the right 
therapeutic strategy for the right person and the right time, 
and/or to determine the predisposition to disease and/or to 
deliver timely and targeted prevention” (European Commis-
sion 2016).
Monitoring what is happening in all the different ‘omics 
in our bodies is going to require increasingly sophisticated 
wearable technology, which involves a link with the fourth 
sense of personalization listed above. Scientists such as Sny-
der have demonstrated ways in which taking these precision 
measurements on a daily basis can lead to openings for timely 
interventions and making significant changes to lifestyle with 
real time measurable results (Snyder 2016). For example, he 
discovered that if he stopped cycling for only a few days it 
provoked a spike in certain adverse measurements. For Sny-
der, this information can be very beneficial for individuals, 
but he envisages that the data collected will have relevance 
to mental as well as to physical health, which may give rise to 
additional ethical concerns.
Consideration of this development, then, suggests that the fu-
ture of personalization requires a combination of developing 
scientific research and wearable technology, with the atten-
dant concerns mentioned earlier about the access to and use 
of the data.
3.10 Personalization as analysis of ‘big data’ 
about the person
The discussion of the coming together of multi-omics and 
wearable technology suggests that one possible interpreta-
tion of personalized medicine requires regarding the person 
as a site of ‘big data’. Those aspects of, or indeed accounts of, 
personal identity (rather than the concept of person as such) 
which depend on the narrative of a person’s life story, are 
very much downplayed in the context of increasing collection 
of micro-level data. Barbara Prainsack notes the broadening 
of the term ‘personalisation’ to include the analysis and in-
terpretation of data at multiple stages “in an era when we, 
ourselves, are becoming data’” (Prainsack 2015 p. 167).
Snyder’s monograph does not give a precise definition of per-
sonalized medicine. He acknowledges, as others have, that 
the practice of medicine has always been personal, although 
his account of what that has traditionally meant is slightly 
different. He argues that doctors have always taken into ac-
count extensive personal information about a patient (Sny-
der 2016). What makes it different now, and what is leading 
to a new paradigm of healthcare, he argues, is the amount 
of ‘big data’ that is and will be available about an individu-
al. As already indicated, data will be collected not only about 
genomic medicine but will increasingly draw upon other 
--omic information, along with environmental and lifestyle 
data, including nutrition and exercise. Snyder’s characteriza-
tion is interesting because it is a point about quantity rather 
than quality, but it might be argued that the sheer volume of 
data will in itself amount to a qualitative change.
The collection, storage and use of personal data has widely 
been recognised to give rise to ethical concerns, with consid-
erable attendant discussion of privacy. The era of big data 
leads to additional concerns about interpretation and access. 
The monitoring of mental health is a potential issue: Snyder 
mentions efforts currently under way to monitor online ac-
tivities to identify early symptoms of mental illness and emo-
tional disturbance (Snyder 2016). ‘Personalized’ medicine 
might offer alternative monitoring modes, which may be to 
the benefit of individuals concerned but may also have a stig-
matizing effect.
In terms of the concept of the person at stake here, one pos-
sibility is that the person is to be understood in terms of in-
formation, and this view has indeed been put forward by Lu-
ciano Floridi (Floridi 2011).  According to Floridi my data is 
not just ‘mine’ it is ‘me’, so talk about ownership of informa-
tion in the context of debates about privacy misses the point. 
It has been argued by Freeman Dyson, however, that while 
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the essence of life is information, information is not synon-
ymous with life. “To be alive, a system must not only hold 
information but process and use it” (Dyson 2016).  Dyson fur-
ther writes that in a human, information is to be found in two 
places, in our genes and in our brains. “The information in 
our genes is certainly digital, coded in the four-level alphabet 
of DNA. The information in our brains is still a great mystery” 
(Dyson, 2016).
Arguably there is a danger that the interpretation of the per-
son as big data could mark a reversal to the picture of the 
patient as a set of symptoms, in a much more detailed form 
(a set of measurements, or data), rather than the ‘patient as 
person’ picture discussed above. If this is combined with a 
reduction in the scope for judgment in individual cases, ‘per-
son-centredness’ in biomedical ethics may also be at risk.
A big data interpretation of personalization might require 
both whole genome and epigenome sequencing at birth plus 
ongoing monitoring with wearable technology, with associate 
challenges about data storage, control and access throughout 
life.   
4 – Combination of different 
senses? 
It is not the case that different senses of personalization 
are necessarily incompatible. Heusser, for one, has argued 
for integration of genomic personalization and person-cen-
tred care (Heusser 2015), but this arguably does not go far 
enough. It is surely possible, in principle, to bring together 
a multi-omic approach to the person while holding on to the 
idea of the person as autonomous chooser. It may be inap-
propriate to interpret the person as a collection of –omic in-
formation. Dyson distinguishes the information in our genes 
from that in our brains, suggesting that there is something to 
the person irreducible to –omic data. Of course, those who 
think that there is something over and above the brain, such 
as the soul, might not be satisfied with this approach. But we 
have to distinguish between those interpretations which real-
ly tell us what a person is and those which tell us something 
about what personalization means as a practical approach to 
health care, which could be compatible with different under-
standings of person.
Arguably the most important potential transformation is the 
importance, demonstrated by epigenetics, of regarding the 
person as situated in an environmental context. This requires 
going beyond even the relational account of the person, as 
to give thought to the interaction between the human body 
and its environment that affects biology itself. This may be 
regarded as not a new idea – after all, we do know that vi-
ruses leave traces in the bodies of those whom they infect. 
But, we are talking about traces that are heritable and this is 
an important step-change in thinking about the relationship 
between the human body and its environment.
5 – Conclusion 
This discussion of personalization, both in interpretations 
and applications, constitutes a reminder of how important 
terminology is. The shift to the term ‘precision medicine’ per-
haps marks an attempt to ditch some of the ‘baggage’ associ-
ated with the terms ‘personalization’ and ‘person’ (Juengst 
et al. 2016) and has also been argued to be relevant to global 
health (Lancet 2017). Even if we adopt the term ‘precision 
medicine’, however, ethical issues remain, such as ‘Who is 
deciding?’, ‘For whose benefit?’, ‘What are the (global) re-
source implications?’, ‘What are the implications of regard-
ing the person as a collection of –omic data?’. 
None of the senses of ‘personalization’ discussed provides 
a completely adequate picture and thus the term cannot be 
regarded as sufficiently descriptive to indicate what is in-
volved in the purportrated new model of medicine. Whether 
the term ‘personalization’ endures or not, respect for persons 
certainly remains important. Genomics and other –omics in-
formation will provide increasingly actionable information, 
but accessing this information may also require greater and 
more intrusive monitoring and individual responsibility. The 
future of health care, if it is ‘personalized’, is personalized on 
multiple levels, requiring thought about the professional-pa-
tient/client interaction and about the extent to which the per-
son’s interaction with the environment can be understood by 
the individual, carers, and health care planners. This is a con-
siderable challenge which is not at first sight apparent in the 
superficial attractiveness of the concept of personalization. 
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